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ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 980073-CA

STUART EARL JOHNSEN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of no contest to
possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone,
a second or subsequent violation, a third degree felony.

This

Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court clearly err in determining that,

given the close timing and sequence of the relevant events, the
flight of the seven men out the back window of the apartment was
not caused by the officer's act of opening the front door?
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that the

warrantless entry of the officers into the apartment to conduct a

1

protective sweep was supported not only by probable cause to
believe that a crime had been or was ongoing but also by the
immediate need to ensure that no one was left inside the
apartment who could harm the officers?
The same standard of review applies to both issues.

That

is, a trial court's findings underlying a suppression motion will
be sustained unless they are clearly erroneous.
869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena,

The trial court's legal

conclusions arising out of those findings, however, will be
reviewed for correctness, according a measure of discretion to
the trial court in applying the legal standard to the facts.

Id.

at 935-40.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This case is governed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession or use of
a controlled substance (marijuana) in a drug-free zone, a second
or subsequent violation, and one count of possession or use of
drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone (R. 1-2). Defendant filed
a suppression motion to exclude the evidence found in the
apartment in which he was apprehended (R. 18-39).

Following an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 18-39,
49, 85-86).

Defendant then entered a conditional plea of no

2

contest to the third degree felony of possession or use of
marijuana.

In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the

misdemeanor paraphernalia charge (R. 93-102).

The trial court

imposed and stayed a zero-to-five year term in the Utah State
Prison, ordered 36 months of probation under certain specified
conditions, and levied fines and fees in the amount of $1184 (R.
110-11).

This appeal followed (R. 122-26).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Near midnight on November 16, 1996, a citizen from an
upstairs apartment in a duplex unit telephoned the Provo city
police to complain of a strong odor of marijuana coming from the
downstairs apartment (R. 71 at 6-7; R. 67 at 22; R. 84). l Two
officers were dispatched to the duplex, where they met two
complainants on the lawn near the stairs leading to the
downstairs apartment (R. 71 at 6-7). The men confirmed that they
smelled burnt marijuana coming from the apartment and told the
police that they thought the renter of the apartment was not at
home (Id. at 7; R. 65 at 29; R. 83). At this juncture, Officer
Knudsen began to suspect a possible trespass or burglary in
progress (R. 64 at 32-33).
Standing with the complainants was a third man (R. 71 at 7;

1

The suppression hearing transcript has been
photographically condensed so that four pages of transcript fit
on a single page of the appellate record. Consequently, the
appellate record cite is followed by "at" and the page number of
the suppression hearing transcript.
3

R. 83). When the complainants told the officers that this
individual had been in the downstairs apartment, Officer Knudsen
turned his attention briefly to him.

The officer testified that

the third man smelled of burnt marijuana (R. 68 at 17, R. 64 at
32-33).
Just before heading downstairs to the apartment, Officer
Knudsen noticed that the apartment door was open a couple of feet
(R. 70 at 8; R. 83). As the two officers approached, however,
the door was closed from the inside (Id.).

Officer Knudsen then

knocked on the door "for quite a while" (R. 128 at 18). No one
responded.

Nonetheless, the officer heard "some definite moving

going on inside, some rustling around" (Id.).

Because the

complainants had suggested that the tenant was not at home and
because there was plainly someone in the apartment who was not
responding, Officer Knudsen "checked the door handle, found it
was unlocked, [and] pushed it open . . . a few feet" (R. 70 at 910).

Without entering the apartment, Knudsen announced his

presence.

At the same time, both officers "got a strong odor of

marijuana" (R. 70 at 10; R. 68 at 19; R. 65 at 30; R. 83).
At this juncture, the officers were notified that people
were running from a back window of the apartment building towards
an adjacent farm (R. 128 at 19; R. 70 at 10; R. 66 at 24; R. 82).
A foot pursuit ensued and, within fifteen minutes, seven
individuals were caught.

None of them admitted to either living

4

in the apartment or knowing who lived there (R. 70 at 11; R. 66
at 24; R. 82).
Officer Knudsen then asked two officers to conduct a
protective sweep of the apartment.

He reasoned:

Because I couldn't find out who the owner
[i.e. resident] was, wasn't sure if there was
still someone in the apartment or not, I had
Officer John and Halliday search the
apartment. . . just for individuals, for
safety reasons. I wasn't sure who was still
in there. I wanted to make sure we could
secure any people still in the apartment, or
locate any weapons in the apartment for
officer safety reasons.
(R. 69 at 12). During the sweep, the officers found defendant
hiding in the bathroom (R. 66 at 25; R. 81). They also saw drug
paraphernalia in plain view, which formed the basis for later
obtaining a search warrant for the apartment (R. 67 at 21; R. 65
at 31; R. 81).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the officer's act of initially opening
the front door of the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment
because it was not supported by exigent circumstances.
Consequently, he argues, all evidence observed in the apartment
after a later protective sweep and seized at a later time
pursuant to a search warrant should be suppressed.

The State

asserts that because the act of initially opening the door
revealed nothing new to the police and because it did not cause
the escape of the occupants, it is legally irrelevant to the
5

pivotal question of whether exigent circumstances supported the
later warrantless entry to conduct a protective sweep.
Defendant also argues that the later warrantless entry into
the apartment to conduct a security sweep was unsupported by
exigent circumstances.

Defendant, however, parses the

circumstances, rather than viewing the overall factual mosaic
from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer dealing with an
evolving set of circumstances.

Viewed as a whole, the facts

plainly demanded immediate police action to freeze the situation
for officer safety reasons.

The trial court so found, and the

evidence supports that determination.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
BECAUSE THE OFFICER'S ACT OF
OPENING THE FRONT DOOR OF THE
APARTMENT NEITHER CAUSED THE
OCCUPANTS TO ESCAPE OUT THE BACK
WINDOW NOR PROVIDED THE OFFICERS
WITH ANY CRITICAL NEW INFORMATION,
THE ACT OF OPENING THE DOOR IS
LEGALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the officer's act of opening the door
to the apartment without consent was unlawful because it was not
supported by exigent circumstances.

Specifically, defendant

asserts that neither the officer's suspicion of possible drug use
in the apartment nor his concern for a possible burglary or
trespass in progress could justify his warrantless entry.
6

And, in any event, argues defendant, any exigency that might have
existed was created solely by the officer's own wrongful act of
opening the door.

See Br, of App. at 17-19, 25-28.

In this case, however, the officer's act of opening the door has
no relevance to the Fourth Amendment exigency analysis.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to suppress, entering specific findings of
fact detailing the chronology and timing of the pertinent events.
See addendum A.

First, as to defendant's assertion that the

officers themselves created the exigency by opening the door, the
trial court found:
8. Opening the door to the apartment, under
the totality of the facts, did not cause the
people to flee out the back of the apartment
as evidenced by someone closing the door as
the officer approached followed by movement
and rustling and the almost simultaneous
departure of 8 [sic] people out the back as
the officer was calling out in front.
R. 82 or addendum A.

Drawing on these facts, the trial court

concluded:
3. The occupants' flight from a rear window
of the apartment as officers were attempting
to make contact at the front door was
virtually simultaneous with the actions of
the door opening and calling to occupants by
the officer. The flight was not caused by
the officer's actions.
R. 80 or addendum A.
Defendant's assertion, then, that the officers created the
exigency by opening the door, is directly contrary to the
7

determination of the trial court.

That is, the trial court found

that the apartment occupants were already alerted to the presence
of the police, as evidenced by the front door being closed from
within as the officers approached, and by the lack of response to
the officer's knocking combined with the continued sound of
movement within the apartment.

The trial court elaborated in its

oral ruling:
I don't believe that we can assume that the
opening of the door triggered the fleeing of
occupants of that apartment. In fact, it's
as logical to conclude that the rustling
sound was people gathering gear and
retreating out the back. They didn't want to
be there any longer. And so it occurred
virtually simultaneously. And I think if not
triggered by the officer just being there,
period, if they saw him as he approached,
that it was an amazing coincidence that they
all just decided to leave through a window
instead of a door.
R. 58 at 57-58.
The record evidence supports the trial court's
determination.

While Officer Knudsen testified that he received

word of several men fleeing the apartment after

he opened the

door, he also made clear in his testimony that the timing of the
events was close.

He stated:

[IJmmediately

after

opening

a strong odor of marijuana.

chance to set foot

[the door],
Before

in the apartment,

I got

I had a

I got

some notification from the other officer that
some individuals were running from the back
of the building.
R. 70 at 10 (emphasis added).

Thus, Officer Knudsen's testimony
8

supports the trial court's determination that no causal link
existed between the officer's act of opening the door and the
men's escape out the back window of the apartment.
Second, even assuming arguendo that the warrantless opening
of the door was unlawful, that act would not mandate suppression
of evidence wholly unrelated to it.

That is, the subsequent

entry to conduct the protective sweep could still be upheld so
long as it was supported by both probable cause and exigent
circumstances independent of the initial door opening.

Cf. State

v. Northruo, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah App. 1988)(reviewing court
assumes unchallenged search warrant was based on information
independent of illegal entry).

Factually, in this case, the

officers gained no new information as a result of opening the
door.

Indeed, Officer Knudsen testified that the apartment

entryway was dark and that, after he opened the door, he could
not see anybody inside (R. 70 at 10, R. 67 at 20, R. 128 at 8).
And, while both officers testified that they detected a strong
odor of marijuana once the door was open, this was not new
information to either of them (R. 70 at 10, R. 68 at 19, R. 66 at
24, R.65 at 30). The two citizen informants had already told
them about the burnt marijuana odor coming from the downstairs
apartment, and that information had been corroborated when
Officer Knudsen smelled burnt marijuana on the third man, who had
reportedly been visiting in the apartment (R. 71 at 7, R. 68 at

9

17, R. 67 at 22).
Defendant likens the facts of this case to State v. Beavers,
859 P.2d 9 (Utah 1993).

In Beavers, however, the police reached

across an apartment threshold to seize a suspect "within the
constitutionally protected confines of a private residence."
at 13.

Id.

Furthermore, by entering the apartment, they were able to

observe several individuals and to corroborate information they
had received prior to entering.

Id. at 11.

In contrast, here,

while the police opened a door, they neither seized anyone as a
result nor gained any information they did not previously have.
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (1998) (initial warrantless
entry into apartment irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis).
The facts found by the trial court and the fair inferences
drawn from the facts render the officer's act of opening the
apartment door superfluous to the Fourth Amendment exigency
analysis.

Because the opening of the door and the flight

"occurred virtually simultaneously," the former could not have
realistically caused the latter.

And because the opening of the

door did not provide the officers with any information, it
neither justifies suppression of evidence unrelated to it nor has
any bearing on the legality of the later warrantless entry to
conduct a protective sweep.

10

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF THE
OFFICERS INTO THE APARTMENT TO
CONDUCT A PROTECTIVE SWEEP WAS
JUSTIFIED BY BOTH PROBABLE CAUSE
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Defendant argues that the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment when they entered the apartment without a warrant to
conduct a protective sweep following the detention of the seven
fleeing individuals.

Defendant does not contest that the smell

of marijuana, reported by two citizen informants and corroborated
by the odor of burnt marijuana coming from an individual who had
reportedly been inside the apartment, created the requisite
probable cause.2

See, e.g., State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 799

(Utah App. 1994), remanded on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah
1996).

Rather, defendant only directly challenges the existence

of an exigent circumstance necessary, in conjunction with

Defendant does question the reliance of the officers on
the information provided by the two citizen informants. See Br.
of App. at 18, 25. However, "reliability and veracity are
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothing from the police in exchange for the information." State
v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993)(quoting State v.
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992)). In this instance,
the two citizens had nothing to gain, and their report of a
marijuana odor coming from the downstairs apartment was based on
first-hand experience. In addition, Officer Knudsen personally
detected the odor of burnt marijuana on the third man, whom the
complainants said had recently been in the downstairs apartment.
The third man did not contest the truth of this statement (R. 7071 at 7-8, R. 68 at 16-17, R. 128 at 5). The marijuana odor on
the third man, then, served as corroboration for the information
provided by the two citizens.
11

probable cause, for the warrantless entry into the apartment.3
See, e.g., State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Utah 1987);
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997).
First, defendant asserts that "the alleged presence of
marijuana should not be considered to be a per se exigent
circumstance" (Br. of App. at 18). Second, defendant asserts
that any initially chaotic situation had been brought under
control once the fleeing men were caught, thus obviating the
officer safety rationale for an immediate protective sweep (Br.
of App. at 21). Finally, defendant asserts that the officer's
suspicions of a possible burglary or trespass in progress were
insufficient to create an exigency (Br. of App. at 25-27).4
Exigent circumstances are those "*that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, escape of the suspect, or some
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law

The law is well-settled that reasonable suspicion will
justify a warrantless protective sweep of a residence incident to
an arrest. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990). In
this case, however, the analytical focus is on the warrantless
entry both because it preceded the protective sweep and because
it was not incident to an arrest. Consequently, the dual
standards of probable cause and exigent circumstances must be
met. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 19 & n.12.
4

Defendant also argues that the officers improperly
created their own exigency by entering the apartment initially.
That argument, however, has already been addressed in Point One.
12

enforcement efforts.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (quoting United
States v. McConnev, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert, denied,
469 U.S. 824 (1984)).

Exigent circumstances, like probable

cause, "must be determined by evaluating the facts available at
the time of the warrantless entry and search.'" Ashe, 745 P.2d
at 1262 (citation omitted).

Thus, in this instance, exigent

circumstances must have existed at the time the officers entered
the apartment.
To determine whether an exigency exists, the totality of the
circumstances must be considered.

City of Orem v. Henrie, 868

P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App. 1994).

And, "[t]he existence of

exigent circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief of
the police officer."

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18.

not evolve from one individual fact.

xx

[E]xigency does

Instead, there is often a

mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself
sufficient."

Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.

Thus, the task of a

reviewing court "is to review the totality of facts and
circumstances of the particular case to determine if the finding
of exigency was proper."

Id.

Here, the trial court entered detailed findings of fact
describing what information the officers had when they decided to
conduct the security sweep of the apartment:
9. Before conducting a protective sweep of
the apartment, officers had determined, (1)
that the neighbors had detected the odor of
marijuana and knew the tenant not to be home;
13

(2) that a person identified by the neighbors
as one of the people who had been in the
apartment did smell of burned marijuana; (3)
that someone had closed the door of the
apartment as the officers approached on the
stairs to speak with the people in the
apartment; (4) that an odor of marijuana was
emanating from the apartment's door when it
was opened by the officer; (5) that at least
7 people fled out the back window as officers
were attempting to speak with them at the
front door; and (6) that the 7 people who
fled, when caught and brought back to the
scene did not live in the apartment and could
not identify who the tenant was.
10. Out of concern for officer safety for
fear that an individual person or persons
might still be inside the apartment and also
because the officers felt that any additional
persons inside the apartment did not belong
there and were committing a trespass or
burglary, two officers walked through the
apartment to check for additional suspects as
a "security sweep."
R. 81-82 or addendum A.

From these facts, the trial court

concluded:
4. The actions of the occupants . . . in
fleeing the scene and then refusing to
identify the owner or occupant or otherwise
explain their actions provided exigent
circumstances justifying the warrantless
entry into the home to determine if any crime
was ongoing.
5. The security sweep of the apartment after
apprehending the people who fled from the
apartment was justified by the probable cause
that a crime had been or was occurring within
the apartment coupled with exigent
circumstances consisting of a legitimate
concern for officer safety because of a
potential threat from unknown persons who may
have still been inside and the need to stop
what appeared to be a trespass or burglary
14

that was taking place.
R. 79-80 at addendum A.

This ruling, carefully enumerating the

totality of the circumstances in which the case arose, is well
supported by the factual mosaic confronting Officer Knudsen when
he authorized the protective sweep, causing two officers to enter
the apartment without a warrant.5
The mosaic consists of three parts.

First, when the

officers arrived at the apartment, they knew only that a burnt
marijuana odor was reportedly coming from the downstairs
apartment.

The two citizens who had telephoned the police

verified this report on the scene, noting also that they thought
the tenant had gone to work.

Officer Knudsen then gained first-

hand corroboration of the citizen report when he turned his
attention to a third man, who had reportedly been visiting in the
apartment and who plainly smelled of burnt marijuana.
The second part of the factual mosaic supporting exigent
circumstances occurred as the officers approached the apartment
to investigate.

Officer Knudsen observed that the front door of

The State assumes, for purposes of this argument only,
that the initial act of opening the apartment door was unlawful.
Consequently, the fourth factor found by the trial court - "that
an odor of marijuana was emanating from the apartment's door when
it was opened by the officer" - will not be considered in
evaluating the presence of exigent circumstances necessary to
justify the warrantless entry into the apartment to conduct the
protective sweep. Cf^ State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 428-30 (Utah
1992)(finding no prejudice or violation of constitutional rights
due to procedural defect in search warrant when search was
authorized under other grounds).
15

the apartment, which had previously been open about a foot or
two, was closed from within.
door repeatedly.

The officer then knocked on the

Because he heard continued rustling and

movement, Officer Knudsen knew there were people inside, yet no
one responded to the knocking.6
The final aspect of the mosaic focuses on the facts arising
out of flight.

First, seven men fled the apartment by climbing

out a back window while the police were trying to make contact at
the front door.

When apprehended after a foot chase, they all

insisted that they neither lived in the apartment nor knew who
did.
The three parts of the mosaic, when considered as a whole
and in conjunction with the fair inferences that may reasonably
be drawn from them, created the exigency justifying the
warrantless entry.

Certainly, the first group of facts suggested

only a routine investigation of marijuana usage or a possible
trespass or burglary in progress.

When the second part of the

A fair inference from these facts is that the people in
the apartment were alerted to the presence of law enforcement
personnel and so closed the apartment door. Their subsequent
refusal to respond to the officer's knocking supports the
inference that they did not want to have any contact with the
police. The continued rustling and movement, in conjunction with
what happened next, supports the inference that the men inside
were making preparations for flight. See State v. Poole, 871
P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994) (police officers are "entitled to draw
reasonable inferences from the surrounding facts in light of
thier knowledge of the area and prior experience") .
16

mosaic fell into place - the apartment occupants closing the door
and refusing to respond to the police —

the level of police

uncertainty and concern plainly increased.

Then, when the seven

men unexpectedly bolted from the rear of the apartment and, when
apprehended, refused to provide any information at all, the full
factual mosaic fell into place to justify the officers'
warrantless entry into the apartment.
At that juncture, while the officers had controlled the
fleeing men, they had no idea who still might be in the apartment
or what might be going on in there.7

Practically, they had an

urgent need to freeze the entire situation and to ensure that
they would not be harmed by anyone still lingering in the
apartment.

Officer Knudsen thus believed that a security sweep

of the premises provided the most reasonable means of creating an
immediate zone of safety.

Because the officer's belief was

7

Defendant argues that the capture of the seven fleeing
men dissipated any exigency that might have been created by their
flight (Br. of App. at 15). To support this argument, defendant
relies on State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996). Wells,
however, addresses a search incident to arrest, under
circumstances where the police knew they had physical control not
only of defendant, but of everyone else in the apartment. That
is, at the time of the search in Wells, a zone of safety had
already been ensured. Here, while the seven men had been secured
on the sidewalk, the situation inside the apartment was still
unknown. Consequently, the need for an immediate protective
sweep was apparent to the officers. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18
(citing United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir.
1979).
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reasonable under the totality of the circumstances confronting
him, this Court should uphold the trial court's determination
that an exigency Existed justifying the warrantless entry.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
third degree felony conviction for possession or use of a
controlled substance (marijuana) in a drug free zone, a second or
subsequent violation.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jS^day

of December, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

c
.c

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH#

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

vs,
Case No. 961401667 FS

STUART EARL JOHNSEN#
Defendant(s).

Judge Guy R. Burningham

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham
presiding, on the 1st day of July, 1997. The Plaintiff was represented
by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor.

The Defendant was

present, in person, and represented by Christine Sagendorf.
heard evidence on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The Court

Being advised in

the premises, the Court makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 16, 1997 police officers were dispatched to 980

North 646 West in Provo because a neighbor was complaining about
marijuana being used in an adjoining apartment.
2.

Officers arrived, just before midnight, and spoke on the street

outside the apartment to two men, Troy Guevara and Jason Campbell, who

stated that they lived upstairs from the complained-of apartment and
could smell the odor of burned or burning marijuana coming from the
apartment.

The men told officers that they didn't believe the renter or

owner of the apartment was present but was at work and that they didn't
know or recognize any of the people in the apartment.

They pointed to

a third person and told officers that "he's one of them".
3.

Officers spoke to the third man, J.C. Thomas Anderson.

The

officer who spoke to Anderson, Officer Knutzen, could detect an odor of
marijuana coming from Anderson.

Anderson said he didn't live in the

apartment and was just visiting.
4.

Officer Knutzen, at that point, reasonably suspected that a

burglary or trespass might be taking place.
5.

The officers then approached the suspect apartment which was

the basement or downstairs apartment.

As the officers started at the

top of the stairs to go down to the door they noticed that the front
door to the apartment was open one to two feet. As they walked down the
stairs, someone from inside shut the door.
6.

Officer Knutzen knocked several times on the door.

As he

knocked and waited, he heard a great deal of rustling and movement
inside the apartment.

At this point the officer had a heightened

suspicion of criminal activity within the apartment.

The officer

checked the front door to see if it was locked and discovered that it
was not locked.

He then pushed the door open to approximately the same

as it had been when he started down the stairs.

The room was dark and

nothing was seen or heard by the officer when the door was opened.

The
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officer called out that he was a police officer and wished to speak to
someone. When the door was opened the officer caught a strong smell of
burned marijuana.

The officers were, at that point, told that people

were climbing out of the back window of the apartment and fleeing the
scene.
7.

Several officers participated for about 10 to 15 minutes

chasing and apprehending 7 to 8 people who had climbed out the back
window and fled the scene.

All were brought back and asked if they

lived in the apartment or knew who did.

All replied that they did not

live there and none could identify the owner or tenant.
8.

Opening the door to the apartment, under the totality of the

facts, did not cause the people to flee out the back of the apartment as
evidenced by someone closing the door as the officer approached followed
by movement and rustling and the almost simultaneous departure of 8
people out the back as the officer was calling out in front.
9.

Before conducting a protective sweep of the apartment, officers

had determined,

(1) that the neighbors had detected the odor of

marijuana and knew the tenant to not be home; (2) that a person
identified by the neighbors as one of the people who had been in the
apartment did smell of burned marijuana; (3) that someone had closed the
door of the apartment as the officers approached on the stairs to speak
with the people in the apartment; (4) that an odor of marijuana was
emanating from the apartment's door when it was opened by the officer;
(5) that at least 7 people fled out the back window as officers were
attempting to speak with them at the front door; and, (6) that the 7
3
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people who fled, when caught and brought back to the scene did not live
in the apartment and
10.

could not identify who the tenant was.

Out of concern for officer safety for fear that an additional

person or persons might still be inside the apartment and also because
the officers felt that any additional persons inside the apartment did
not belong there and were committing a trespass or burglary, two
officers walked through the apartment to check for additional suspects
as a "security sweepM.
11.

During the sweep officers found the defendant hiding in a

locked bathroom.

Officers also saw drug paraphernalia which was not

seized but merely described in an affidavit in support of a search
warrant which was obtained and executed, resulting in the seizure of the
evidence sought to be suppressed by this motion.
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1#„

Officers had a reasonable

suspicion that

the crimes of

trespass, burglary and/or use of controlled substances were being
committed

in

the

apartment

after

hearing

the

statements

of

the

complaining citizens and speaking to the third man identified as one of
the group in the apartment.
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that criminal conduct was
occurring within the apartment and that important evidence would be
found in the apartment upon considering the statements of the neighbors,
4
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the encounter with the man identified as "one of them", observing the
door to the apartment close as the officers descended the stairs,
observing the sound of movement and rustling inside the apartment before
knocking on the door.
3. The occupants1 flight from a rear window of the apartment as
officers were attempting to make contact at the front door was virtually
simultaneous with the actions of the door opening and calling to
occupants by the officer.

The flight was not caused by the officer's

actions.
4. The actions of the occupants, however, in fleeing the scene and
then refusing to identify the owner or occupant or otherwise explain
their actions provided exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless
entry into the home to determine if any crime was ongoing.
5.

The security sweep of the apartment after apprehending the

people who fled from the apartment was justified by the probable cause
that a crime had been or was occurring within the apartment coupled with
exigent circumstances consisting of a legitimate concern for officer
safety because of a potential threat from unknown persons who may have
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still been inside the apartment and the need to stop what appeared to be
a trespass or burglary that was taking place.
DATED this

If

day of August, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

GUV R. /BURNINGHMT y'-W., ;;; /*• g
DISTRICT JUDGEVV" ( >4^ % % ?

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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